Here Comes the Sun (Reprise):

Few foreign policy issues have undergone as much discussion, with as little progress, as North Korean denuclearization. But perhaps it is not yet time to abandon all hope. While the North Korean regime has typically been characterized as hostile, isolationist, and erratic, it seems to be showing a genuine interest in finally putting down its nuclear arms, entering the age of globalization and rejoining the international community.

One indication of the North's interest in globalization is the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Park, where some 23,000 North Koreans are now employed by companies from the South. The industrial park has been touted as a tangible success for South Korea's "Sunshine Policy", which seeks to foster peaceful cooperation between the two Koreas. North Korea's new openness has also manifested in more novel ways, such as its receptiveness towards the “music diplomacy” practiced by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, which is performing Arirang in Pyongyang. Indeed, North Korea has proposed talks about fielding a unified Korean team for the Beijing Olympics — a form of collaboration which has not been seen since the World Ping Pong Championships of 1991. On the political front, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) confirmation that the Yongbyon facilities have actually been shut down and the return of the $25 million in frozen North Korean assets were welcome developments. For a while, it seemed as if we were making the first genuine steps towards progress since the implosion of the Agreed Framework in 2002. Alas, things fell apart.

During the recent talks in Geneva between Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, negotiations seem to have stalled over North Korea's alleged covert uranium enrichment programs and secret transfers to Syria. This information led South Korea to question the North’s sincerity and commitment to denuclearization, and it has threatened to halt expansion of the Kaesong industrial complex — a vital lifeline for the North. There has also been a delay in building the promised light water reactors to replace the North's graphite-moderated weapons-capable nuclear power plants. The path the Six-Party Negotiations are going down bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the failed Agreed Framework, where talks broke down amidst allegations that Pyongyang had Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) programs. A quick examination of the history of talks between the U.S. and North Korea may offer a few lessons to avoid the pitfalls of the past and move ahead with denuclearization.

The United States needs to evaluate just how critical immediate disclosure of HEU facilities is. In 2002, former Chief Negotiator James Kelly met with North Korean officials to relay America's belief that North Korea possessed HEU. He demanded they disclose the location and size of all stockpiles before construction of the light water reactors continued. The Koreans predictably maintained that they had none and insisted the United States offer proof to the contrary. The North Koreans grew suspicious when the U.S. was unable to substantiate its claims and withdrew from the NPT, closing their country to foreign scrutiny. The United States, by making accusations too early, indirectly lost any chance of being able to search for conclusive evidence.

At the heart of the Six-Party Negotiations is the desire for a denuclearized Korea. While full disclosure and open information is important, it comes at a cost. It may not be worth risking the entire agreement over the information Secretary Hill is currently demanding, which relates more to past activities than to current capacities. In the long run, we are far more likely to elicit greater openness from North Korea if we do not make further progress contingent on immediate disclosure, but continue to develop areas of agreement. North Korea has shown itself to be very amenable to an “action for action” principle and has commensurately opened up its nation for every show of good faith by the US. We cannot afford to compromise on issues such as eliminating North Korea's ability to process weapons-grade plutonium, but other issues, such as the HEU, are battles which can be fought another day.

Another contentious issue is North Korea’s long-standing demand to be removed from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism. Pyongyang believes that it is economically handicapped by being on that list, but the United States is waiting until North Korea takes more steps towards full disclosure and denuclearization first. This is an issue in which the benefits of making a concession to North Korea would far outweigh the costs. While opponents to the delisting would accuse the US of ideological inconsistency and appeasement of Pyongyang, the fact of the matter is that North Korea has not been officially associated with a terrorist attack since 1987. Removing them from the list will redress this inaccuracy, and would also leave North Korea without a scapegoat for its economic woes.

One of the most important lessons we can learn from the failure of the Agreed Framework is that rhetoric must be followed with action. The single most damaging event was the Republican-controlled Congress' immediate reversal of the deal brokered by President Clinton. While they did not have the legal authority to overturn the Agreed Framework, they blocked funding for the light water reactors we had promised Pyongyang. This analysis leads to a few policy prescriptions for our current situation. First, South Korea must not withdraw its support from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is one of the most viable and effective routes to opening up North Korea. Threatening to dry up this economic lifeline will only antagonize a regime that is already feeling the strains of poverty and hunger. Likewise, South Korea and the United States must not renege on their promised deliveries of heavy fuel oil, which North Korea desperately needs to generate electricity. Finally, it is important that the U.S. presidential candidates firmly declare their commitment to upholding the results of the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean delegation has historical reason to believe that a new administration will result in a different U.S. policy towards the North, and might choose to hedge its bets or stall until they can ascertain what the new policy is. Thus, if we are to see any real progress by the end of the year, both Democrats and Republicans must maintain a unanimous front, supporting a consistent foreign policy towards North Korea.

The recommendations above are not meant to be a comprehensive list by any means. Rather, they are but a few of the areas in which we can improve our policies to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Some might criticize this approach as giving up too much to North Korea, and link it to the appeasement of Germany pre-World War II. The crucial difference is that (despite rumors to the contrary) Kim Jong-il is fundamentally a rational actor. His quest to acquire nuclear weapons is not a megalomaniacal power grab but rather a defensive attempt to deter more powerful states such as the United States from attacking. Unlike its regional neighbors, North Korea is an economically insignificant nation with very little political capital. Consequently, it resorts to nuclear threats as a way of grabbing attention and influence in regional decisions. Those who believe Pyongyang poses a direct nuclear threat to the United States need only consider the fact that Kim Jong-il would lose his leverage and risk a serious counterattack if he actually acted on his rhetoric and detonated a nuclear bomb. Ultimately, North Korea fears being left out of regional decision making and will continue to issue nuclear threats for political leverage. If we are ever to achieve a long term solution and address the North’s underlying motivations, we need to maintain a consistent policy of engagement towards them over the long term. This will reassure Pyongyang that it can continue to exercise international influence through diplomatic means, and would make the nuclear option unnecessary – which, after all is essential to the region’s stability and safety.