FARC(E): Hollow Support of Ecuador

On March 1st, the Colombian government ordered a raid across its border with Ecuador with the intention of killing a long-term and hotly pursued officer for Farc, the left-wing rebel group hidden within Colombia’s jungles. The details of the raid are not important except for the fact that the Colombian government did not communicate or ask permission of the Ecuadorean government in advance of the incursion. Almost immediately after the raid, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered nearly 9,000 troops to the border, threatening war with Colombia and loudly denouncing the raid in international media outlets. Ecuador soon sent troops to its border with Colombia, while at the same time, appealing to South American nations to condemn Colombia's actions. The Organization of American States, a group of South and Central American nations, was convened at the request of the Ecuadorean government to resolve the issue. An agreement, still somewhat secretive, was arranged which would ease tensions by creating a council to investigate the actions taken and assign guilt.

Friction between these three governments is nothing new. Historically, this action may have may have ignited a full-scale war against Colombia; indeed, for that reason, there was genuine fear of war early in this crisis. Colombia has never had easy relationships with these neighbors, especially recently, as Venezuela and Ecuador have been increasingly at odds with the pro-American, anti-socialist and right-leaning Colombian government. In fact, Hugo Chavez has often made public his criticisms and lack of respect for Colombia, as well as his ideological fraternity with Farc’s criminals/smugglers/kidnappers. Peace has never been guaranteed. In fact, this may be why Colombia decided to eschew Ecuador’s consent for their raid, in favor of effectiveness.

I am not claiming that Colombia’s decision was correct. Both sides of this controversy are reasonable. While Colombia has increasingly found its efforts against Farc frustrating due to a porous border and Ecuador’s disinclination to aid the Colombian effort, Colombia did break international law with this raid. While the government did find a dangerous and powerful rebel whose organization was responsible for countless atrocities, it also eliminated the prospects for future cooperation. The situation was a difficult one, but ultimately Colombia’s legitimate concerns did not supersede their duty to international due process.

What I am arguing is not that Colombia was right, but rather that Venezuela was wrong, having no business involving itself in this situation in the manner it did. Hugo Chavez has made his animosity toward Colombia known by openly treating Farc as a legitimate international actor despite the objections of the Colombian government, by trying to negotiate deals when he knows that his actions undermine the goals of the Colombian state. Chavez has consistently been guilty of meddling in his neighbor’s internal affairs with even more regularity than Colombia could ever have been accused, giving a notable twist of irony to the shock and horror that Chavez showed at the Colombian raid.

More than simply hypocrisy defines this argument, however. Chavez’s actions after the raid were unacceptable and he manipulated the situation to his own advantage. He is no friend of Ecuador. He did not help to defend Ecuador.

Chavez moved his troops to the Colombian border in a supposed move to show solidarity with Ecuador against Colombia, but in reality this did not stand up for Ecuador. This aggressive move never gave Ecuador the opportunity to react on its own terms; it had to react on Venezuela’s terms. Ecuador could not contact Colombia and try to work out a resolution to this problem privately, but was compelled to react aggressively alongside Venezuela. Hugo Chavez forced Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa to either show strength or look weak and thereby lose respect. Immediately, the situation escalated without Ecuador even contacting Chavez. He knowingly forced the issue, strategically stripping Ecuador of any choice in the matter.

What followed was a circus. Hugo Chavez played the role he loves - the lone socialist, rebelling against aggressive powers and fighting for the people. Meanwhile, Ecuador half-heartedly went through the motions that Venezuela demanded. Colombia defended itself, and finally Ecuador and Colombia were able to negotiate a settlement.

Why would Chavez do this?

The first reason is a classically manipulative one. Hugo Chavez has had recent trouble at home, finally losing the momentum from his electoral victories from previous years. His bid to gain even more powers for his own office and to radically change the manner in which the Venezuelan government functions failed. His coalition is showing signs of wear as his anti-imperialist rhetoric falls on the increasingly deaf ears of a bored electorate and his political power may be waning. But Chavez is no fool. He understands the source of his power, which comes from him appearing to be the voice of the people, standing up to those who would hurt them. This situation gave him the ability to regain that image and he will undoubtedly benefit from it with some short-term political gains. The international community will continually see this as a pattern in his behavior. If Chavez looks like he is having political trouble again, expect more of the same: pigeon-holing his allies, undiplomatically screaming insults at enemies, spoon-feeding crises to his electorate.

Chavez honestly believes that Colombia’s leaders are natural philosophical enemies, and he desperately wants to cover up what he has done to hurt them. After the Ecuadorean crisis, Colombia quietly released some information (which surprisingly did not gain more international coverage) that was recovered from the raid. Included in the rebels’ laptops and files was detailed information acknowledging Hugo Chavez’s political and financial support of Farc. I urge the reader to look up the Colombian government’s press release. Publicly, Chavez has denied that he has ever given money to the particular group of rebels and he has somewhat less specifically denied any political support for Farc. While he considered them kindred political spirits publicly, Chavez has denied that his negotiations and discussions with Farc have involved anything more than releasing hostages. Now we know that this is patently untrue. In fact, Chavez’s government has been undermining the Colombian government by supporting the rebels who hope to overthrow it.

It is unclear that any in the international community have recognized this blatant manipulation. Many in South America have been strong-armed or bribed into towing the Venezuelan line; others quite simply consider themselves allies. But many in the international community, who gained little, if anything from this situation, have also kept silent. We are witnessing a common problem unfold - as a strong and seemingly powerful leader makes noise, many leaders simply desire to ignore the situation, rather than stand up for what is right. What could any country gain from standing up against Chavez and supporting Colombia? They would be labeled as imperialists, as tyrants, as American puppets. America could barely help, because animosity toward the U.S. drives much of this dynamic. Chavez will keep this up until the international community finds an incentive to stop him. There is none yet, other than conscience.

Chavez’s outspoken support for Ecuadorean sovereignty was not as courageous as it appeared, but was instead manipulative. His passionate support for territorial sovereignty can only been seen as a veil for his political motives. Chavez’s lies, his money and his actions, public and private, testify to his two-faced politics.