The Precedence of Kosovo: The Case for Recognition

February 17, 2008 sent nations with secessionist minorities scurrying to shield the eyes of their minority groups from the R-rated spectacle of Kosovo’s self-declared independence. Much as they tried, Kosovo grabbed headlines as the United States and key European powers legitimized the secession by swiftly recognizing the new state. Nations desperate to prevent their own minorities from following suit now appeal to the international community with their one fear tactic left. They use the dreaded word: precedent.

The word conjures up nightmares of Kosovo's example inspiring secessionist movements from South Ossetians in Georgia to the Ainu in Japan to the Barotse in Zambia to rise up and demand independence. Though Kosovo will undeniably set a symbolic precedent and does have important effects on the strategies of similar independence movements, such a free-for-all pandemonium is unrealistic. It is clear that many of the arguments raised in support or condemnation of Kosovo’s declaration of independence have been made on the basis of strategic interest rather than moral or ideological principles. Countries such as Russia, China, Georgia, and Spain object to the secession, fearing it will (re)rouse secessionist sentiments within their own minority groups. On the other side are the United States, much of the EU, and Turkey. They recognize Kosovo's statehood in pursuit of separate interests, whether it is U.S. hopes of potential oil profits, the EU's desire for a firm regional ally to balance Russia and China, or Turkey’s desperate attempt to prove to the EU that it can uphold democratic principles despite its suppression of its own Kurdish minority.

Despite the influence of realpolitic on some vies of Kosovo’s secession, the nation’s declaration of independence has still managed to split the world along a new line; not one of GDP, democratic ideals or culture, but of self-determination. A nuanced perspective on the situation will evaluate how Kosovo's self-declared independence has altered the strategic calculations of nations and secessionist movements alike.

Secessionist movements often arise in response to systematic economic oppression and a historical right to autonomy. For example, Hungarians in Slovakia enjoy the same rights as ethnic Slovakians and as a result, the two groups peacefully coexist. In contrast, groups such as Tibetans and Kurds have sought autonomy as a means of escaping oppression, claiming a historical right to their respective lands. Kosovo’s independence may offer symbolic inspiration to such groups, but its example is unlikely to have a practical impact.

Thus, Kosovo is more likely to set a precedent for movements closer in geography and circumstance. These include the Transnistrians in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia. These minorities operate with de facto independence and share a historical and cultural relationship with the Caucusus and Russia. They have all long called for independence and are arguably equally (un)prepared for it as Kosovo was. South Ossetia, in particular, has international endorsement from Russia which parallels Western support for Kosovo. Such minorities have long recognized the parallels between their cause and that of Kosovo's, and are likely to use its example as evidence that they need not settle for insufficient and limited autonomy.

In addition to inspiring secessionist movements, this episode may prompt world powers like China and Russia to retaliate against America's support for Kosovo over their objections. They may choose to selectively support particular self-determination movements to harm strategic U.S. interests. For example, Russia can demand the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, putting American oil interests in the region at risk.

Many objections to Kosovo’s independence are inconsistent with the realities of the situation. Spanish officials, fearful of the precedent set for the secessionist Basque, have declared Kosovo's independence illegal on the basis that it was a province, not a federal republic, and thus not allowed to secede under the Yugoslav constitution. Manuel Ortega, a Spanish MP, argued further on the BBC that the consequences of Kosovo’s independence are “an invitation to civil war.” Ortega’s argument is not especially convincing. Firstly, legality is not at issue. Secession is illegal by definition; few countries willingly give up territory. Without illegal secession, self-determination objectives, justified or not, would never be realized. Secondly, such a war is clearly preventable, and thus the threat is not adequate justification to deny Kosovars their right to self-determination. Once this reality is accepted, diplomatic relations to prevent the outbreak of war between the states can ensue. Moreover, Kosovo has clearly offered a hand of peace to Serbia, with extra provisions in the new constitution for the protection of Serbs in Kosovo. It is now up to Serbia to prevent violence.

It has also been argued that since many minorities with equally legitimate claims to independence have not yet succeeded, it would be unfair to consider the self-declared Kosovo a legally independent state. This argument, however, oversimplifies self-determination movements and ignores the unique complexities and impediments of each. Kosovo is unique, particularly given its close relationship with the international community. This goes back to 1999, when it was placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and the NATO-led international peacekeeping force Kosovo Force (KFOR). Its historical association with the global community raised international awareness of Kosovo’s cause and made it harder for progressive countries such as the US and most of the EU to ignore the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the late 1990s. NATO’s long-standing international presence in Kosovo and the widespread recognition of war crimes against ethnic Albanians won Kosovo the support of powerful nations such as the US and EU. Most movements have not achieved this kind of international recognition, but their disadvantaged position is no reason to challenge the legitimacy of an independent Kosovo. Moreover, if a “fairness doctrine” is applied to the principle of self-determination, is it “fair” that nations such as Turkey, Spain, and Russia are independent and sovereign, while minorities within their states – Kurds, Basques and Chechens amongst others, respectively – are not?

Kosovo faces many challenges. It is a poor country that must start afresh to integrate itself in the world economy and at the same time develop a system that protects and manages its Serbian minority. Kosovo's neighbors, such as Serbia, Russia, and other proximate states, need to cooperate to prevent the region from again descending into ethnic violence. The pressure is now on the world’s superpowers to accept it and prevent the creation of another reliant Balkan state.